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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 263 
Accident time: 10:00 Accident Date: 30/11/1999 
Where it occurred: One km west of 
Ladrovac village, Suva 
Rica, MNB South 
Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Other (?) Secondary cause: Other (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident 
(survey) 
Date of main report: 02/12/1999 
ID original source: KC/MD/JF Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-2 AP blast Ground condition: leaf litter 
route/path 
woodland 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 03/03/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 3 
 
Map details 
Longitude: 85° 45' 5_" E Latitude: 04° 96' 0_" N 
Alt. coord. system: DN 85530 05017 Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series: KFOR Misc 003 
Map edition: 6 Map sheet: 12&13 
Map name: 1:50,000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 








1. This is a comprehensive report by the Investigation Team on the mine accident that 
occurred on the 30 of November 1999. Based on the statements from the personnel 
involved in the accident included in [demining group’s] Mine Accident Report and the 
photos from the accident site, this accident is considered as an non-preventable mine 
accident.  
2. The Investigation Team consisted of the following MACC personnel: 
Quality Assurance Officer. 
Quality Assurance Officer EDD. 
Quality Assurance Medical. 
Order of events 
3. On 30 November 1999, an ex-pat Team Leader, an interpreter and the Victim were 
tasked to confirm whether site 059 at grid 845 052 was still identifiable and marked. The 
Team Leader used the demining group’s reconnaissance report dated 21 October 1999. 
The Team Leader had never been to this specific site before hence another Team Leader 
had conducted the marking/survey level 2 at site 059. The MACC had advised that the 
demining group should revisit the sites and check that the areas were as the teams left 
them and if necessary, carry out remedial work. The purpose was just confirmation, no 
further work was to be carried out. 
4. As the Team Leader was looking for any signs of the benchmark or any other marking 
from the site, he used a track well used by the locals. This track had hazard warning tape 
leading down (red and white chevron tape), either side of it forming a corridor. There were 
no mine signs or any other signs of restricting access and the track was marked in a way 
that it should be safe to use. The Victim was tasked to park 15 metres down the track and 
the Team Leader and the Victim alighted from the vehicle. The Team Leader proceeded 
down the track on foot with the Victim 10 metres behind.  A detonation took place and the 
Victim set off a mine. The Team Leader took immediate action to remove the Victim from 
the dangerous area and initiated casevac procedures. 
5. With help of local people the casevac continued and the locals took him by road to the 
military hospital in Malisevo from where he was airlifted to Prizren at approximately 11:24. 
6. At 11:50 the demining group’s Operation Manager was notified of the accident. Another 
Team Leader and his medic had at that time left their site to assist at the accident place. 
7. In the afternoon the demining group’s Programme Manager and Team Leaders visited 
the accident site to carry out visual assessment. The following are the contents of the 
visual assessment: 
• The accident place was marked with red and white chevron plastic tape on both 
sides. 
• There were no mine signs visible at this time. 
• Local population frequently used the track. 









8. The demining group’s staff then erected mine signs at the entrance to the track. The 
entrance was also marked with mine tape. In the opinion of the Operations Manager, 
there was no requirement to forensically seal any mine/UXO clearance equipment as no 
mine/UXO clearance activity was being undertaken at the time of the accident. 
9. After being informed by the demining group of the accident, the MACC Chief Operations 
Officer tasked the QA Office to conduct an investigation. Following an assessment of the 
information, the QA Officer requested another commercial demining group (Group B) to 
provide a mine/UXO clearance team for investigation purposes.  
10. On the 1 December, the MACC investigation team with the Group B mine/UXO clearance 
team were led by the demining group’s Program Manager to the accident site. On arrival 
at the accident site, there were Team Leaders and a medic at the site.  
11. After a quick summary of the events and an accident site description, the Group B 
deminers started to clear a safe lane for the investigation team. The demining group’s 
Operations Manager pointed out that there were three breaching lanes that had been 
cleared on the East site of the marked area. This was one of the indications that the 
marking was possibly done by a mine/UXO clearance organisation. The Group B 
deminers were requested to QA one of the lanes that had been cleared by the unknown 
organisation.  
12. Using the demining group’s interpreter on site, we questioned the local population with 
regards to who had been working in the area. Two ex-UCK soldiers indicated that they 
had removed PMR-2 mines in the field adjacent to where the accident occurred and 
informed us that the area was still suspected to have PMR-2 mines. One boy mentioned 
that an ex-UCK Operations Officer from the region might know who had been working on 
that site. We were introduced to the ex-UCK officer and asked him the following 
questions:  
• Do you know who marked the area were the accident took place yesterday? 
Approximately three weeks ago Albanian deminer’s led by what he thought to be 
a German expatriate, driving green vehicles had worked in the area. They were 
the ones who marked the area.  
• What do you know about that area?  
I personally removed 93 mines (PMA-2, PMR-2A and PROM-1) in that area. He 
identified them on pictures.  
• Did you talk with the deminers that marked the area?  
Yes and I told them that I found 93 mines in that area. 
• What did you do with the mines?  
I gave them to KFOR. 
13. According to the ex-UCK Operations Officer the organisation that did the clearance at the 
accident site only cleared the high ground and did not clear the bottom because it was full 
of mud and water.  
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14. During the Group B clearance operation a local kid walked by the deminers and 
attempted to head up the trail where the accident happened. He was stopped by the 
deminers and told that there are mines in the area. 
 
15. A substantial amount of metal was found in the area marked as safe. [One of the scrap-
areas is shown in the picture above.] 
16. On arrival to the MACC HQ, verification was done in the weekly report to identify which 
organisation had been working in that area. It as found that Group C had teams working 
exactly in this area during the week of 1- 6 November 1999.  
17. On the morning of the 2 November the Programme Manager from Group C came to 
MACC HQ to clarify what had happen and to explain what his group intended to do with 
this dangerous area. In the afternoon, he came back with the expatriate in charge of the 
team that did the marking at the accident site and they gave a brief explanation of what 
had occurred three weeks before.   
  
General Information 
18. The following information was obtained from the Operations Manager and witness 
statements of personnel at the accident site: 
• Name of the injured person 
• Company 
• Location: One km west of Ladrovac village. 
• GR: DN 85530 05017 
• Time of the accident: Approximately 10:00. 
• Date: 30 November 1999  
• Time of the CASEVAC requested: Approximately 10:10 he was evacuated by 
road to the military hospital in Malisevo from where he was airlifted to Prizren 
German military field hospital at approximately 11:24. 
• Transportation used: land rover vehicle.   
• Type of injuries: Right foot and minor injuries on right hand from blast. 
• Number and names of the witness: One witness, ex-pat team leader. 
• Suspected type of device or mine: PMA-2. 
• Action at time of accident: Verification of BAC marking fence. 
 
Conclusions 
19. The following are conclusions based on the investigation: 
• The Team Leader and the Victim were more then one kilometre from site 059 at 
the moment of the accident. 
• Group C marked the area where the accident occurred as a cleared area three 
weeks ago.  
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• The casevac procedure went well. 
• The demining group marked the track and the area with mine signs immediately 
after the accident.  
• During the clearance operations conducted by Group B for investigation 
purposes, evidence indicating that the area marked by Group C had not been 
cleared in accordance with the MACC guidelines and standards. 
• Ex-UCK local had found mines in that area and reported to them when Group C 
was marking the area.  
• The locals on a regular basis use the track, especially the kids that go to the 
school. 
• The Victim had his right foot amputated and minor blast damage to his right hand. 
• This accident was non-preventable. 
 
Recommendations 
20. The following are recommendations based on the investigation findings: 
• Better hand over between the Team Leader or with the Operation Manager 
should have been done before sending the Team Leader to check the marking of 
the site. 
• Further investigation will have to be conducted to clarified with Group C why they 
decided to mark without taking in consideration the information from the local ex-
UCK that lifted mines in the area. The following questions will have to be 
answered during the investigation: 
• How was the clearance operation conducted? 
After partially marking the area, why did he do not submit a Dangerous 
Area Report or Survey Report? 
What kind of information did the site supervisor pass to Group C 
management after he marked the area? 
What kind of action is Group C going to take? 
• Group C will have to send back a clearance team to clear the trail used by the 
local population and mark the rest of the Dangerous Area for the winter period. 
• As soon as possible, mines awareness presentations should be given to the local 
population, especially kids.  
• It is obvious that the supervisor of Group C made the assumption that it was safe 
to mark the area cleared. The end result of the assumption should be explained 
and passed on to all mine/UXO clearance organisation in Kosovo. 
 
Signed: UNMIK MACC, QA Officer 
Signed: UNMIK MACC, Programme Manager 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 337 Name: Name removed 
Age: 22 Gender: Male 
Status: surveyor  Fit for work: not known 
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Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 14 minutes 
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 




Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
An internal injury report recorded that the victim suffered lower leg blast injuries. 
A letter from the German KFOR field hospital gave the victim’s date of birth and stated that 
the victim had “a below-knee amputation of his right leg”. 
A letter from the demining company reported that the victim has also suffered “blast damage 
to his right hand, in particular his 4th and 5th digits”.  




The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Other" because the peculiar circumstances 
prevent it being classified under the usual headings. The accident investigators identified 
failings at management level, but these were not failings of the group that suffered in the 
accident. 
The victims were engaged in a confirmation survey and presumed (as civilians would have) 
that the marked corridor was safe. As full surveyors, they should have been better equipped. 
Tasked with visually confirming that marking was in place, their lack of protective and medical 
equipment was apparently not a breach of operating procedures. Their apparent lack of 
communications equipment may have been such a breach. This kind of missed-mine accident 
usually occurs to civilians and so is rarely included in this database.  
Potential inadequacies in communications and marking were identified during the 
investigation and recommendations were made.  
The report demonstrated an unusually thorough and critical approach to accident 
investigation. The Mine Action Co-ordination Centre which carried out the investigation was 
not engaged in demining, and this may (in part) explain the unusually objective nature of the 
investigation. However, there is some room to wonder why surveyors, who are not supposed 
to believe the old markings they encounter, were not required to be equipped with the means 
to check areas and also equipped for a possible medical emergency. 
  
Related papers 
The Accident report included an illustrated site map and many photographs of the site. 
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In a summary on mine/UXO accidents in Kosovo, (undated but covering September 1999 - 
August 2000), this accident was "considered non-preventable". The summary included 
"Lessons learned" and listed: 
1) "Better hand over between team's leader or with the Operation Manager should be done." 
2) "After marking the area, always submit a Dangerous Area Report or Survey Report." 
3) "Never make the assumption that it is safe to walk in an area mark[ed] by an unknown 
organisation." 
 
Internal Demining group Accident report 
[The following has been edited for anonymity.] 
1 Background 
At approximately 1000hrs on Tuesday 30 November 99 a national member of [the Demining 
group] ([the Victim]) sustained serious injuries after being involved in a mine accident. This 
happened in the Ladrovac area of Kosovo. 
He had been performing his duties as a driver/interpreter with an international team leader. 
The team leader had been tasked to confirm whether or not the permanent marking was still 
in place at a cluster strike site previously surveyed by [he Demining group] (known as 
[Demining group] site 059, grid Reference: DN 845 052). 
The team leader decided to investigate what he thought was the correct approach track, 
trying to locate the benchmark of the site. The track which meandered through a copse of 
trees was apparently in constant use by the local population, even though temporary mine 
tape had been placed by an agency/person unknown, to either side of the track with some 5m 
between the marking. It appeared to delineate suspect areas to either side of the track. The 
track led to what appeared to be a previous VJ defensive position but this could only be seen 
from a distance. The original survey report made reference to a Serbian defensive position in 
the vicinity. 
The team leader had walked approx 30m along the track, when there was an explosion 
approx 10m behind him. [The Victim], who had been following, had stood on a concealed anti-
personnel blast mine. 
[The Team Leader] immediately recovered him form the area and a medical evacuation from 
the scene ensued. The victim was evacuated to the local town hospital facility in Malishevo, 
where he was stabilised by a [a Doctor] prior to being helicopter evacuated to the German 
military field hospital in Prizren A German military medical team arrived with the helicopter 
and departed at 1142hrs. 
 
2.  Personal details of injured 
[omitted] 
 
3. Suspected injuries sustained 
After questioning the medical practitioners that stabilised him, it was ascertained that he had 
received a traumatic amputation of the whole right foot from the ankle down. Also blast 
damage to his right hand, in particular his 4th and 5th digits. 
The full extent of his injuries will not be known until they are released by the hospital. 
 
4. Accident details 
Time of explosion: 1000hrs Grid reference: DN 855 049 
Approximate location: !km from the village of Ladrovac, Suva Raka, Kosovo. 
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5. Next of Kin 
The next of kin (Mother and Father) were immediately located and informed. They were taken 
to the hospital facility in Prizren to be with their son, soon after the accident. His brothers were 
also briefed on the accident. 
 
6. Details of [the Demining group] site 059 
Situation: NATO cluster strike area 
Grid Reference: DN 845 052  Name: Ladrovac 
Date surveyed:  15 Nov 99  Action:  Area reduced and marked 
Priority:  Medium  Team leader: [Name excised] 
Remarks: Tasked by MACC to confirm permanent marking still in position 
 
7. Investigation/Follow up 
The MACC were informed during the late afternoon of the 30th November. It is planned that a 
Mine Action Team deploy with MACC operational staff to carry out an investigation on Wed 1 
Dec 99. 
Further details and statement will be forwarded when forthcoming. 
Signed: Programme Manager 
 
Statements 
What follows are selected extracts from statements made by the demining group, edited for 
anonymity. 
 
Ex-pat Team Leader 
The Team Leader gave the precise position of the accident as: DN 855 049 and the time as 
10:00. He reported that he, the interpreter and the Victim were tasked to confirm whether site 
059 at grid 845 052 was still identifiable and marked. He used the reconnaissance report 
dated 21 October 1999. He had not been to the site before - another Team Leader had 
conducted the marking/survey level 2 at site 059. 
As the Team Leader was looking for any signs of the benchmark or any other marking from 
the site, he used a track well used by the locals. This track had hazard warning tape leading 
down (red and white chevron tape), either side of it forming a corridor. There were no mine 
signs or any other signs of restricting access and the track was marked in a way that 
indicated it should be safe to use. 
The Victim was tasked to park 15 metres down the track and the Team Leader and the Victim 
alighted from the vehicle. The Team Leader proceeded down the track on foot with the Victim 
10 metres behind. A detonation took place and the Victim set of a mine. The Team Leader 
took immediately action to remove the Victim from the dangerous area and initiated casevac 
procedures. With help from local people the casevac continued and the locals took him by 
road to the military hospital in Malisevo from where he was airlifted to Prizren. 
 
Programme manager 
The Programme manager reported that he was notified of the accident at 11:50. By that time 
another Team Leader and his medic had left their site to assist at the accident place. In the 
afternoon the Country manager, Team Leader and Programme Manager visited the site to 
carry out a visual assessment. 
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They found that: 
• The accident site was marked with red and white chevron plastic tape on both 
sides. 
• There were no mine signs visible at this time. 
• The track was frequently used by the local population. 
• The assessment team concluded this was a well-used safe route. 
They then erected mine signs at the entrance to the track. The entrance had also been 
marked with mine tape. 
It was their opinion that there was no requirement to seal equipment as they were not carrying 
out clearance nor survey. Their reasons for using the marked path to visit the demining site 
had been: 
• To confirm that the site was still identifiable and marked. 
• MACC had advised them to revisit the site and check that the areas were as we 
left them and if necessary carry out remedial work. The purpose was just 
confirmation not further work to be carried out. 
 
Operations manager 
At 11.50 on the morning of the 30th November 1999, one of our drivers notified me that [the 
Victim] had had a mine accident. At this point I was not quite sure if this was an accurate 
story. I called an interpreter to get to the bottom of the this and on further questioning found 
out that there was an accident and that [Name excised 2] and medics had left their site 071 to 
assist [Name excised] at site 059 (Grid 845 052) 
At 1205 I dispatched two lorries to site 071 to pick up [Name excised 2] team and return to 
Dakovica. 
On arrival back at Dakovica I immediately got on the radio in the returned Landrover to find 
out what had happened. Up to that point I did not have communications nor transport. 
After all personnel had returned to Dakovica, the Programme Manager, Team Leader and 
myself visited the accident site to carry out a visual assessment. 
I found that the track where the accident took place was heavily wooded on both sides and 
marked with red & white chevron plastic tape both sides, secured around the trees. There 
were no MINE signs visible at this time. 
This track was frequently used by the local population including school children going to and 
from school. From this I would conclude this was a well used safe route. 
[The Demining group] had erected mine signs at the entrance of the track after the accident, 
but some other person between the accident happening and [Name excised] returning to the 
area had erected the same type of tape across the entrance. 
There was no requirement to seal equipment as they were not carrying out clearance nor 
survey, however due to it being a mine accident on the track, I was not in a position to enter 
the area without a MAT carrying out an instrument clearance of the track between the red & 
white taped area. 
 
Reason for visit to site 059 
The reason for the task was to confirm that the site was still identifiable and marked. 
At no time was there any further work to be carried out at this stage except confirmation. This 
had been advised by the MACC that we should revisit our sites and check that the areas were 
as we left them and if necessary carry out remedial work. 
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There was no requirement to send whole teams at this stage around our previously surveyed 
or marked sites, only those that required re-fencing or marking. 
This is all the information I have at this time. 
Signed: Operations Manager 
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